Wykaz publikacji wybranego autora

Piotr Faliszewski, prof. dr hab. inż.

profesor zwyczajny

Wydział Informatyki
WI-ii, Instytut Informatyki


  • 2018

    [dyscyplina 1] dziedzina nauk ścisłych i przyrodniczych / informatyka


[poprzednia klasyfikacja] obszar nauk technicznych / dziedzina nauk technicznych / informatyka


Identyfikatory Autora Informacje o Autorze w systemach zewnętrznych

ORCID: 0000-0002-0332-4364 orcid iD

ResearcherID: brak

Scopus: 14044821700

PBN: 5e70922b878c28a047391119

OPI Nauka Polska

System Informacyjny AGH (SkOs)





Liczba pozycji spełniających powyższe kryteria selekcji: 157, z ogólnej liczby 159 publikacji Autora


1
  • A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain
2
  • A characterization of the single-peaked single-crossing domain
3
  • A framework for approval-based budgeting methods
4
  • A quantitative and qualitative analysis of the robustness of (real-world) election winners
5
  • A richer understanding of the complexity of election systems
6
7
  • Achieving fully proportional representation by clustering voters
8
9
  • Achieving fully proportional representation in easy in practice
10
  • AI's war on manipulation: are we winning?
11
12
  • Algorithms for Destructive Shift Bribery
13
  • Algorithms for swap and shift bribery in structured elections
14
  • An analysis of approval-based committee rules for 2D-Euclidean elections
15
  • An experimental comparison of multiwinner voting rules on approval elections
16
  • An experimental view on committees providing justified representation
17
  • An NTU cooperative game theoretic view of manipulating elections
18
  • Approximation algorithms for BalancedCC multiwinner rules
19
  • Approximation algorithms for campaign management
20
  • Approximation and hardness of Shift-Bribery
21
22
23
  • Between proportionality and diversity: balancing district sizes under the Chamberlin-Courant rule
24
  • Boolean combinations of weighted voting games
25
  • Bribery as a measure of candidate success: complexity results for approval-based multiwinner rules